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I. INTRODUCTION
A new trend has jurors demanding more forensic evidence' in criminal
trials before deciding to convict an accused. Some in the legal community and
in the media trace this demand back to popular television shows that depict
crime scene investigations, such as CSI: Crime Scene Investigations ("CS1");
however, it is more probable that this demand has come naturally, through our
society's own cultural and technological advancements. This demand for scien-
tific proof also comports with our collective ideas about justice. As the demand
for such evidence rises, so does the level of trustworthiness a jury has for the
expert introducing such evidence at trial. Because the demand for forensic evi-
dence not only means that the prosecution feels compelled to produce such evi-
dence at all costs but also means that the jury gives the forensic expert a height-
ened level of trustworthiness to the detriment of the defense, there is a signifi-
cant need for change in the way such evidence is used and standardized. This
Note uses the unchecked fraud of Fred Zain, a now infamous figure in the foren-
sic community, and the inability of the indigent defendant to acquire rebuttal
forensic experts as a call for change.
Much has been made of this trend in forensic evidence in recent years.
Judges and prosecuting offices have conducted studies to survey the validity of
this demand for forensic evidence.2 In addition, defense attorneys point to in-
stances of significant fraud, on the part of several prominent forensic examiners,
as a call for change in the treatment of forensic evidence.' No matter which side
of the courtroom an attorney sits, it is clear that this issue is paramount in to-
day's criminal justice system. The issues confronted here go to the heart of our
collective idea of justice: that only a truly guilty person should be robbed of his
or her liberty.
Television shows like CSI are certainly sexy, but what effect, if any,
does a show like CSI have on society's concept of truth and justice? Do jurors
I As used in this Note, see infra Part II, "forensic evidence" refers to the scientific collection
and analysis of physical evidence in criminal cases. This includes tests such as fingerprinting, hair
analysis, bite mark analysis, and DNA testing. See Counterterrorism and Forensic Science Re-
search, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: LABORATORY SERVICES,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/counterterrorism-forensic-science-research (last visited Feb. 21,
2012).
2 See, e.g., Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Juror Expectations for Scientific Evidence in Criminal
Cases: Perceptions and Reality about the 'CSI Effect' Myth, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1 (2010);
CSI: Maricopa County: The CSI Effect and its Real-Life Impact on Justice, MARICOPA COUNTY
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (June 30, 2005),
http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jc2008/references/csilCSIEffect report.pdf [hereinafter MCAO].
See, e.g., George Castelle, Lab Fraud: Lessons Learned from the 'Fred Zain' Affair,
CHAMPION, May 23, 1999, at 12.
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who become "educated" about crime scene investigations through watching
these shows become experts in the jury room? Many prosecutors argue in the
affirmative.4
When scholars first began studying this phenomenon, later termed the
"CSI effect" by the media and the legal community, scholars debated whether it
existed. Most determined that if the CSI effect did exist, its existence had never
been proven empirically; therefore, there was no way to definitively answer the
question.5 However, now that empirical studies have proven there is some sort
of effect on today's juries, what is it? 6 Our society today is more technologically
and scientifically advanced than ever before. Even jurors with only basic
knowledge are more savvy than those jurors who took the box ten years ago.
This new awareness of technology and scientific methods means that jurors de-
mand more scientific evidence than ever before. Although at first this would
seem more burdensome for the prosecution, those representing the government,
state or federal, have vast resources on their side when compared to the indigent
defendant. Additionally, once this scientific evidence is produced, it creates an
almost irrebuttable presumption of guilt in the mind of the juror. This is most
evidenced in the fraud of the Fred Zain affair. Fred Zain's fabrication of evi-
dence went unchecked for years. His ability to find conclusive forensic evidence
proving a defendant's guilt when there seemingly was none made him a star
witness for the prosecution, but what did he leave in the wake of his fraud?
This Note offers arguments for change in the way that forensic evidence
is treated in a criminal trial. Part II surveys the evidentiary law behind the ad-
missibility of forensic evidence, the indigent defendant's right to a forensic ex-
pert, and the convicted person's right to DNA testing. Part II also gives an over-
view of the American jury system and the origins of the CSI effect. Part III ana-
lyzes several arguments for change in the treatment of forensic evidence, from
the irrebuttable presumption of guilt, to the CSI effect, to the inability of the
indigent defendant to acquire his or her own forensic expert, and to the fraud of
Fred Zain. Part IV reviews recommendations for change in the treatment of fo-
rensic evidence. This Note is intended to provide significant support for change
4 See, e.g., MCAO, supra note 2, at 5 ("In June 2005, the Maricopa County Attorney's Office
conducted a survey of 102 prosecutors with jury trial experience.... The prosecutors were asked
about their experiences with jurors seeking irrefutable physical and scientific evidence and their
perceptions of a possible 'CSI Effect' among juries. This study found a significant CSI influence
in Maricopa County juries.").
5 See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in
Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 (2006).
6 See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 2, at 34 ("Rather than any direct CSI Effect from watching
certain types of television programs, our studies in Washtenaw and Wayne Counties suggest that
these juror expectations and demands for scientific evidence are the result of broader changes in
our popular culture, fostered by the mass media and by litigants' beliefs that the effect exists.
Those broad and pervasive changes lead jurors to expect that the prosecutor and the defense will
obtain and present the scientific evidence that technology has made possible.").
2012] 1157
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in the treatment of forensic evidence as well as survey recommendations for that
change.
II. BACKGROUND: THE BUILD UP OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE
Most scholars agree that forensic evidence has been used in criminal
cases for more than a century.' The term "forensic medicine" was first used in
1816, thus, replacing the older term "medical jurisprudence."8 It was not until
1936 that the term "forensic science" was used in any official capacity, and it
was not until the 1960s that the phrase took on its now widely known meaning:
forensic "denote[s] the police officers and scientists who specialise in the collec-
tion and analysis of trace evidence left at crime scenes."9 As one commentator
said, "Today, it is commonplace to speak of 'forensic evidence,' yet barely two
generations ago, this would have seemed a meaningless tautology."o
Because forensic evidence has long been used in criminal trials, the case
law regarding forensic evidence developed with the application of less stringent
evidentiary standards than the standard which is followed in the majority of
jurisdictions now." Recently, however, many in the scientific and legal com-
munities have begun to cast doubt on the reliability and validity of much foren-
sic testimony. 12
A. Legal Background
Much of the legal background concerning forensic evidence falls under
the Rules of Evidence, both in federal and state courts. 13 Forensic evidence is
presented at a criminal trial through the testimony of an expert.14 To rebut this
7 See, e.g., Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Forensic Science Evidence and Judicial Bias in Criminal
Cases, 49 JUDGES J. 18, 18 (2010).
8 Michael J. Clark, Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL, Historical
Keywords: Forensic, 366 LANCET 1351 (2005) ("[T]he earliest use of the corresponding English
expression seems to have been in George Edward Male's Epitome ofJuridical or Forensic Medi-
cine (1816). Thereafter, 'forensic medicine' gradually replaced the older term 'medical jurispru-
dence."').
Id.
10 Id.
" Shelton, supra note 7. See also infra Part II.A. 1 for a discussion of the previous "generally
accepted" standard versus the modem standard for forensic testimony.
12 Shelton, supra note 7. ("The last 20 years have ushered in an era of doubt about the validity
of forensic testimony.").
13 Although the specific rules for expert testimony may vary through jurisdictions, the follow-
ing is a discussion of generalities that are true for all jurisdictions, federal or state; specific juris-
dictional rules are noted as such.
14 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 702; W. VA. R. EviD. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
1158 [Vol. 114
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testimony, the Rules of Evidence allow for the defendant to strongly cross-
examine the expert" as well as produce an expert for the defense.' 6 Once a de-
fendant has been convicted, most states also have statutes that outline the con-
victed person's right to DNA testing.' 7
1. The Rules of Evidence
The United States Supreme Court promulgated the admissibility re-
quirements of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
have recently changed. The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility
of expert testimony under Rule 702.18 The Rule states,
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testi-
mony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the ex-
pert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.' 9
Forensic evidence, however, received its introduction in criminal trials, both
federal and state, under the old rule and the old test for admissibility articulated
1s See FED. R. EVID. 611(b); W. VA. R. EVID. 611(b).
16 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and other similar state evidentiary rules, such as
Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, provide for the opinion testimony of a qualified
expert witnesses at trial; however, some of the most difficult questions courts have faced in re-
gards to expert testimony is what are the rights of the indigent defendant who cannot afford an
expert. See infra Part II.A.2.
17 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14 (LexisNexis 2011) (setting out the rights and pro-
cedures for "a person convicted of a felony currently serving a term of imprisonment" to request
DNA testing).
18 FED. R. EvID. 702. The rule was amended twice in recent history. See FED. R. EVID. 702
advisory committee's note. The language of the rule was amended in 2000
in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert, including Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, [526 U.S. 137] (1999). In Daubert the Court charged trial judges
with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert
testimony, and the Court in Kumho clarified that this gatekeeper function ap-
plies to all expert testimony, not just testimony based in science.
Id. The rule was amended again in 2011 "as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make
them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules.
These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any
ruling on evidence admissibility." Id
19 FED. R. EVID. 702.
2012] 1159
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by the D.C. Circuit in Frye v. United States20 in 1923.21 The Frye test articulated
a "general acceptance" test for scientific principles. 22 "Some states still use the
'general acceptance' test" but most states as well as federal courts use the "re-
vised admissibility standard[s]" developed by the Court in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 3 The Daubert standard, now codified in the Rule,
requires the judge to assess the scientific validity of the proposed testimony
under Rule 702 by evaluating the reasoning and methodology used by the ex-
pert. 24
Although the Daubert standard was articulated in a civil case,25 the case
and the decisions subsequent to it2 6 have "significantly changed the legal land-
scape for the admission of forensic science evidence in criminal cases."27 The
standard of admissibility has risen from "general acceptance" to requiring the
trial judge to determine "scientific validity, requiring empirically sound theoret-
ical foundations appropriately applied to the particular case."28 This new stand-
20 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
21 Shelton, supra note 7.
The use of forensic evidence in criminal cases in the United States is well over
a century old. The case law developed with the application of the Frye doc-
trine, which required only that such testimony be "generally accepted." As
more courts admitted testimony from any particular forensic science field,
other courts used those decisions to bolster the idea that the field was "gener-
ally accepted." There was rarely any challenge to the scientific reliability of
such evidence, especially if proffered by prosecutors. The routine acceptance
of forensic expert testimony for the prosecution expanded beyond areas of
physical science or physical examination. Psychologists, sociologists, social
workers, and even counselors or police officers were allowed to give their
opinion that the testimony, or other conduct, of a complainant was consistent
with a person who had been sexually abused in the manner similar to that de-
scribed by the complainant. Nevertheless, most courts did not allow social
scientists proffered by the defense to testify to the unreliability of eyewitness
testimony.
Id.
22 Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 200 n.4 (W. Va. 1993).
23 Shelton, supra note 7, at 19. For a detailed listing of the admissibility standard used in each
state for scientific evidence see id. at 23.
24 Id. at 19 ("The Court held that when faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony
under Rule 702, the trial judge must preliminarily assess the scientific validity of the testimony's
underlying reasoning or methodology and determine whether it can be properly applied to the
facts at issue.").
25 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
26 "[T]wo subsequent Supreme Court amplifications ... commonly referred to as the Daubert
trilogy, directed trial judges to examine the principles and methodology of proffered scientific
evidence, rather than focus only on conclusions as to what was generally accepted." Shelton,
supra note 7, at 19 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)).
27 Id.
28 Id.
1160 [Vol. 114
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ard requires criteria such as "proof of testability, error rate, and peer review.
Additionally, the Court pronounced "the trial judge as the 'gatekeeper' who
must make the scientific reliability and applicability assessment of the proffered
evidence before it may be presented to the jury."3 0 As the "gatekeeper," the trial
judge has an enormous responsibility under this standard.
Like most states, the West Virginia Rules of Evidence were "modeled
after their federal counterparts; therefore, the history of the federal rules pro-
vides guidance in interpreting [West Virginia's] rules."3 ' More precisely, West
Virginia "[R]ule 702 is identical to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence."32 Consequently, West Virginia has adopted the Daubert standard of
admissibility.33
2. The Indigent Defendant
As expert testimony moves to the forefront of criminal trials, the indi-
gent defendant has received some statutory rights in order to hire his or her own
expert. In federal trials, "the Criminal Justice Act provides for expert assistance
for indigent defendants . . . . The Act, however, limits expenses for experts to
$1,000.00 unless the court certifies that a greater amount is 'necessary to pro-
vide fair compensation for services of an unusual character or duration."' 34 Most
states also have similar provisions, but the amount of money given to the indi-
gent defendant for a forensic expert is usually shamefully minimal. In West
Virginia, for example, the indigent defendant has a statutory right to request
payment for an expert witness, but the trial court must still approve such ex-
29 Id
30 Id
31 Gable v. Kroger, 410 S.E.2d 701, 702 (W. Va. 1991).
32 Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 200 (W. Va. 1993) (adopting the Daubert standard in
regards to expert testimony).
33 Id. at 203.
34 Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHics 535, 539 (2005) (footnote omit-
ted).
3 Id. The state statutes providing for expert assistance for indigent defendants differ in a varie-
ty of respects. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-
Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1305, 1339-40 (2005). For a discussion on the
differences see id. Among other differences he explains that
some statutes provide for the payment of reasonable expenses, while others
specify a maximum amount. Some of these limits are shamefully low: $250
for each capital defendant in Illinois, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3(d) (West
2011), and $300 per expert in ... New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
604-A:6 (2011). In some instances, statutes that establish maximums do per-
mit reimbursement for expenses above the maximum in extraordinary circum-
stances.
Id (internal citation omitted).
2012] 1161
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pense.36 The defendant must (1) request the expert in writing; (2) "detail why
the expert is needed"; (3) have the opportunity to elaborate on the motion; and
(4) if the request is denied, the trial court should place specific reasons for its
ruling in the record.37
The Supreme Court has also recognized the constitutional need for indi-
gent defendants to have access to certain experts, such as in the realm of psychi-
38
atry. In recognizing this right, the Court was concerned with an indigent's
"[m]eaningful access to justice."3 9 In other words, when a state brings its judi-
cial power down upon an indigent defendant, "it must take steps to assure that
the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense." 40 This fundamental
principle,
grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the
belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of
his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at
stake.41
The Court further stated "a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State
proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has ac-
cess to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense."42 In
determining that, in some instances, a psychiatrist is just such a raw material,
the Court specified that a defendant has access to a competent professional, not
necessarily the defendant's own psychiatrist or even a psychiatrist that the de-
fendant likes.43 The Court has yet to determine whether a forensic expert is such
a raw material.
36 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-13a(e) (LexisNexis 2012) ("Actual and necessary expenses
incurred in providing legal representation for proceedings of any kind involving felonies for
which a penalty of life imprisonment may be imposed, including, but not limited to, expenses for
travel, transcripts, salaried or contracted investigative services and expert witnesses, shall be re-
imbursed in an amount as the court may approve.").
37 State v. Brown, 552 S.E.2d 390, 402 (W. Va. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting Syl. pt. 1, State ex
rel. Foster v. Luff, 264 S.E.2d 477, 478 (W. Va. 1980)). In Brown the court found no error in the
decision of the trial court to deny the defendant payment for an expert jury specialist even though
the trial court failed to specify its reasons for denying the motion. Id. at 402-03.
3 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
3 Id. at 77.
40 Id. at 76.
41 Id.
42 Idat77.
43 Id. at 83 ("We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his
sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum,
assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examina-
tion and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. This is not to say, of
1162 [Vol. 114
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Even though many courts, both state and federal, now in some instances
provide access to forensic experts, appellate courts have been reluctant to re-
verse a trial court's decision not to grant an expert to an indigent defendant."
For example, the Tenth Circuit denied a petitioner's appeal because the forensic
expert testimony proposed by the defense at trial did not go beyond the level of
pure speculation. 45 The petitioner, Malcolm Rent Johnson, appealed a decision
of the district court that denied his request for habeas corpus relief.46 Many be-
lieve now that the pure speculation was actually the testimony of the state's fo-
rensic expert witness, Joyce Gilchrist.47 Gilchrist testified that samples taken
from the victim's bedroom showed semen with Johnson's blood type; semen
that her colleagues later found did not exist. 48 Based on Gilchrist's bunk scien-
tific testimony, Johnson was convicted of murder and sentenced to death; he
was executed in Oklahoma on January 6, 2000.49
3. DNA Testing Rights
Once convicted, in most states, the defendant still has a right to one fo-
rensic test: a DNA test. DNA testing is the analysis of the genetic component of
cells in the human body in order to identify identical genes.o In West Virginia,
an individual convicted of a felony serving a term of imprisonment may motion
course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his person-
al liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the indigent defendant have ac-
cess to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose we have discussed, and as in the case of the provi-
sion of counsel we leave to the State the decision on how to implement this right.").
4 See, e.g., Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 1999); see also State v. Lee, 976 So.
2d 109 (La. 2008).
45 Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1247.
46 Id
47 Police Chemist Is Rebutted After Man's Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/30/us/police-chemist-is-rebutted-after-man-s-
execution.html?ref=joycegilchrist.
48 Id.
49 Id. For a more detailed discussion of the case see infra Part III.C. 1.
50 Donald E. Riley, DNA Testing: An Introduction for Non-Scientists, An Illustrated Explana-
tion, SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY: AN ONLINE JOURNAL (Apr. 6, 2005),
http://www.scientific.org/tutorials/articles/riley/riley.html.
DNA is material that governs inheritance of eye color, hair color, stature, bone
density and many other human and animal traits. DNA is a long, but narrow
string-like object. . . . Our body's cells each contain a complete sample of our
DNA... . Basically, every part of the body is made up of these tiny cells and
each contains a sample or complement of DNA identical to that of every other
cell within a given person. There are a few exceptions. For example, our red
blood cells lack DNA. Blood itself can be typed because of the DNA con-
tained in our white blood cells.
Id.
2012]1 1163
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the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction for a DNA test." The
motion will only be granted where, among other requirements, the identity of
the perpetrator of the crime was significant in the case, and DNA testing would
raise a reasonable probability that the convicted person's verdict would be more
favorable. 52 The request will be denied where the evidence to be tested was
merely one piece used at trial, and even without that evidence taken into consid-
eration, the state still had overwhelming evidence to convict the petitioning in-
dividual.53 This statutory right, however, only arises after conviction.
B. The Jury System
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees judgment by a ju-
ry in a criminal trial.54 The text of the Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defense.
This right has been incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as the right to a speedy trial,5 6 the right to a public trial,57 and the right to
an impartial jury.58 The right, however, does have its limitations. The Supreme
Court has ruled that jury trials for petty offenses, crimes carrying a potential
punishment of less than six months, are not guaranteed. 59
A "jury trial begins with the summoning of a group of people as poten-
tial jurors and eliciting information from them in a process called the voir
dire."60 Although courts may conduct voir dire differently-some courts allow
51 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14 (LexisNexis 2011).
52 Id
53 State ex rel. Burdette v. Zakaib, 685 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 2009) (denying post-conviction
DNA testing because (1) the cigarette butt that petitioner sought to have tested was merely one
piece of the evidence used at his trial, and (2) a thorough review of the record revealed that even
without the cigarette butt, the State still had overwhelming evidence to convict petitioner).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5s Id.
56 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
57 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
58 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).
s9 RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 1 (2003).
60 Id. at 16.
[Vol. 1141164
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the attorneys to question the jurors while in other courts the judge will conduct
the questioning -the process allows for each side to gain information about
the potential jurors. Based on this information counsel can eliminate potential
jurors by exercising challenges. 6 2 The number of jurors is prescribed by the ju-
risdiction and is usually either six or twelve. After the jury is selected, the
judge instructs it on some of the basic law and procedures applicable to the
case.6 This is followed by opening statements, and then the attorneys are off in
pursuit of their respective cases.s
C. CSI Effect Background
The supposed CSl effect is a much discussed phenomenon among jurors
in the media and by those in the legal community. It has been credited with the
modern juror's demand for more physical and scientific evidence at trial. Many
in the legal community link this demand to television shows like CSI: Crime
Scene Investigations.6 6 The show now has several spin-offs, CSI: Miami and
CSI: New York, and is shown in syndication practically twenty-four hours a
day.67 Since the inception of this type of show, millions of viewers have tuned
in to watch episodes like Iced, where three bizarre murders are solved in an hour
using a myriad of high-tech science, most of which is not available in reality. 68
An example of the unrealistic standard of scientific evidentiary proof
employed in the show CSI appears in the episode Harvest.69 In this episode, the
61 See, e.g., W. VA. TRIAL COURT R. 42.03.
(a) The attorneys conducting the case shall be permitted to ask voir dire ques-
tions of the prospective jury panel members unless the presiding judicial of-
ficer finds that there are justifiable reasons to deny such attorney voir dire....
(b) If attorney-conducted voir dire is not permitted, the attorneys conducting
the case may request that the judicial officer ask specific additional or sup-
plemental voir dire questions of the prospective jury members.
Id.
62 JONAKAIT, supra note 59, at 16.
* Id.
64 Id.
65 See W. VA. TRIAL COURT R. 42.04(a) ("Opening Statements. At the commencement of trial
in a criminal action, the State and the defendant may make non-argumentative opening statements
as to their theories of the case and the manner in which they expect to offer their evidence.").
66 See, e.g., MCAO, supra note 2, at 2-5.
67 Id. at 4 ("Nine of the top 20 rated shows nationally are forensic crime television dramas ....
Cable television and satellite television make past episodes of these programs available twenty-
four hours a day."); see also Tyler, supra note 5, at 1052.
68 See Tyler, supra note 5, at 1052.
69 Id. at 1058-59 (citing CSI: Crime Scene Investigation: Harvest (CBS television broadcast
Oct. 14, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.crimelab.nl/transcripts.php?series=1 &season=5&episode=3).
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investigation "crew encounters the twisted Perez family."7 0 The family has a
twenty-year-old son dying of leukemia, so the parents genetically engineer their
youngest daughter in order to harvest her body for organs, bone marrow, and
stem cells. 7 1 Trouble for the family starts when the little girl goes missing and is
later found dead.72 Fibers and footprints link the father to the crime scene; how-
ever, the real killer is the terminally ill son, who ground poison into the girl's
milk to put her out of her misery. Of course, the whole story is wrapped up in
one hour, and the physical and scientific proof is so concrete that it forces the
father to confess to dumping his daughter's body.74
The majority view among legal scholars is that the CSI effect does not
exist.7 5 Several speculate that if there is any heightened expectation among ju-
rors, it comes from our society's own cultural advancements in technology and
information sharing, not a fictional television show. However, many lawyers
in the criminal field argue that the CSI effect is very much real. 7
III. PSEUDO-SCIENCE AND THE CSI EFFECT: A PERFECT STORM FOR FRED
ZAIN
The heightened demand from jurors for forensic evidence, no matter
this demand's source, has created a need for change in the way such forensic
evidence is treated. The pressure on the prosecution to produce this evidence
could lead a forensic examiner to overstate results or, at worst, completely make
them up. Combined with this demand for forensic evidence is the juror's
heightened trust for the testifying forensic examiner at trial. This trust creates an
insurmountable obstacle for the defense. Because of both factors-the propensi-
ty to falsify evidence and the trust for the examiner by the jury-the way in
which forensic evidence is treated needs significant improvement.
A. Pseudo-Science and an Irrebuttable Presumption of Guilt
Not all forensic evidence is created equal; therefore, not all forensic ev-
idence should be treated equally by a jury. "Statistics can have the unfortunate
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1059.
7 Id.
74 Id. at 1058-59.
7 See, e.g., id. at 1053 ("While the CSI effect has been widely noted in the popular press, there
is little objective evidence demonstrating that the effect exists. As is often the case with legal
issues, the pace of public discussion has outstripped the ability of scholars to research the issue.").
76 See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 2, at 12.
7 See MCAO, supra note 2, at 2.
78 See, e.g., infra Part III.D (discussing the fraud of Fred Zain).
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quality of lending an appearance of legitimacy to questionable scientific conclu-
sions or, as the [c]ourt stated . . . '[P]suedo-science is eminently convincing
because it is accompanied by all the mumbo-jumbo of real science. "79 Pseudo-
science is also particularly damaging because of the level of trustworthiness a
jury gives to a forensic science expert. Scientific experts at trial create an irre-
buttable presumption of guilt in the minds of the jury, whether the expert is pre-
senting pseudo-science or a more reliable scientific testing. As discussed below,
there is little one can do to exclude forensic evidence from trial even if it is
"pseudo-science."
1. Post-Daubert
Daubert changed the admissibility requirements of expert testimony
from a "generally accepted" test to a test where the trial judge must determine
the scientific validity of evidence.80 Although in the civil context Daubert is
often used by the defense and judges to exclude the plaintiff s expert testimony,
in the criminal forensic field, it has received little attention."
Some scholars argue that if the Daubert standard were taken as strin-
gently in criminal cases as it is in civil cases, much of what we think of as fo-
rensic science evidence would not be admitted in trial.82 One reason is that most
of the testimony in the forensic field "has no origin or basis outside of the con-
text of criminal investigation and litigation."83 Another reason for exclusion
under the Daubert standard is the lack of reliability and standardization in many
forensic tests, such as fingerprinting and hair analysis. 8 4 Even though in recent
years there have been significant questions, such as these, as to the validity of
many forms of forensic science evidence, "criminal court judges, at both the
trial and appellate levels, continue to admit virtually all prosecution-proffered
expert testimony."85
The "general acceptance" of most all prosecution proffered forensic ev-
idence does not stop the defense in some cases from moving the court to ex-
clude the prosecution's forensic expert witness. In United States v. Havvard,86
7 In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 519
n.34 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting State v. Thomas, 421 S.E.2d 227, 232 (W. Va. 1992) (internal cita-
tions omitted)).
80 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Shelton, supra note 7,
at 19. For a discussion, see supra Part II.A. 1.
81 Shelton, supra note 7, at 19-20.
82 See id. at 20.
83 Id
84 See infra Part III.A.2 for further discussion of pseudo-science techniques.
85 Shelton, supra note 7, at 20.
86 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
Havvard was charged with being a felon in possession of firearms.. . . Before
trial, Havvard filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the government from of-
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for example, Havvard's defense attorney filed a motion to exclude the govern-
ment's expert fingerprint witness, arguing that the expert's opinion was a sub-
jective opinion and that it was not sufficiently reliable.8 ' Havvard supported his
argument by relying on the fact that the examiner refused to give a standard by
which latent fingerprints are matched, and he described the examiner's opinion
as subjective. In response, the government argued that the test is so well-
established that a hearing was not even needed, and that the judge should "es-
sentially take judicial notice of the [test's] reliability."89 Although the court did
not use the government's logic, it still found the test satisfied the Daubert stand-
ard.90 In doing so, the court focused on the fact that the fingerprinting technique
can be tested, it has a low error rate, and it is peer-reviewed.9' The court con-
cluded by saying "[i]n fact, after going through this analysis, the court believes
that latent print identification is the very archetype of reliable expert testimony
under those standards." 92 Even under the standards of Daubert, Havvard did not
have a chance at keeping the fingerprinting expert's admittedly subjective opin-
ion out of court.93
2. Pseudo-Science
There are several types of investigative tools at a forensic examiner's
disposal, including fingerprinting, ballistics, and bite mark analysis.94 Two of
fering an expert opinion on whether a latent fingerprint recovered from one of
the firearms in question matched Havvard's left index finger. Havvard con-
tends that opinion evidence on latent fingerprint identification does not meet
the standards of reliability for admissible expert testimony ....
Id. at 849. The case has not been overturned on appeal.
87 Id. at 850.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 851.
90 Id. at 853-54 ("The court has adapted the Daubert reliability factors to this case, and those
factors strongly support the reliability of latent print identification despite the absence of a single
quantifiable threshold.").
91 Id. at 854-55.
92 Id. at 855.
93 The court was quick to point out, however, that Havvard
had his own consulting expert on fingerprint issues. He also had the oppor-
tunity at trial to call his own witness to offer a different opinion or to show the
jury if there was any discrepancy between the latent print on the firearm and
the known print of the defendant's index finger. He did not do so.
Id.
94 Depending on the resources available, forensic examiners have a wide range of techniques
and methodologies available to them. "Some of the forensic science disciplines are laboratory
based (e.g., nuclear and mitochondrial DNA analysis, toxicology and drug analysis); others are
based on expert interpretation of observed patterns (e.g., fingerprints, writing samples, toolmarks,
bite marks, and specimens such as hair)." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI.,
[Vol. 1141168
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these tools, however, are on opposite ends of the reliability spectrum: hair anal-
ysis and DNA profiling. DNA profiling has a stringent standard of proof, but
hair analysis has no such standard.95 At an ever-increasing rate, hair analysis is
moving towards the realm of "pseudo-science mumbo-jumbo."
a. Hair Analysis
Although on television hair analysis may seem concrete and absolute, in
reality, it is probably the most controversial and subjective forensic analysis
available.96 One scholar has said hair analysis "is comparable to telling the jury
that the perpetrator wore a white shirt and the defendant owns a white shirt."97
Unlike other more concrete forms of forensic analysis, forensic examiners are
not required to follow a set of uniform standards to declare a match between two
hairs. One examiner may decide a lower number of features on the hairs is
acceptable to declare a match than another examiner.
The National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") Report on forensic science
found that "testimony linking microscopic hair analysis with particular defend-
ants is highly unreliable." 99 This finding was stunning to many in the legal
community because hair evidence has been used and relied upon as material
evidence for more than a century. 00 With this recent revelation among forensic
examiners, it remains to be seen how much this type of evidence will be relied
upon or admitted in future trials. Judging from the treatment given to forensic
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter NAS REPORT].
9 Id. ("With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis .. . no forensic method has been rigorous-
ly shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source. In terms of scientific basis, the
analytically based disciplines [such as DNA analysis] generally hold a notable edge over disci-
plines based on expert interpretation [such as hair analysis].").
96 "The most controversial aspect of expert testimony involves attempts to individuate the hair
sample." Paul C. Giannelli, Microscopic Hair Comparisons: A Cautionary Tale, 46 CRIM. L.
BULLETIN 1, 24 (2010). Hair analysis consists of several steps:
[t]he first step in the analysis is determining whether a sample is a hair rather
than a fiber. Next, the examiner attempts to ascertain (1) whether the hair is of
human or animal origin; (2) the part of the body that the hair came from
(scalp, pubic, or limb hair); (3) racial origin; (4) whether the hair has been
dyed; (5) whether the hair was pulled or fell out as a result of natural causes or
disease; and (6) whether the hair was cut or crushed.
Id. The examining expert views the hair both macroscopically and microscopically, and the ulti-
mate determination of indentifying characteristics is left to the opinion of the examining expert.
Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 3.
9 NAS REPORT, supra note 94, at 161.
100 Giannelli, supra note 96, at 1.
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evidence under the Daubert standard by the Havvard court, however, hair anal-
ysis will likely be admitted by trial courts in perpetuity.
b. Forensic Serology and DNA Analysis
DNA profiling, unlike other forensic science techniques, is not unique
to criminal law; it is the cutting edge of science.' Therefore, unlike other fo-
rensic techniques used by crime labs across the country, such as hair analysis,
DNA profiling has always been held to the high stringent standards that scien-
tists use when conducting research. 10 2 It has been an invaluable tool in proving
the innocence for many wrongly convicted defendants, and as discussed later, it
was DNA that exposed a sixteen-year fraud by one infamous West Virginia
serologist, Fred Zain.' 03 One report said of wrongful convictions that "[t]he
chief culprit in over seventy-five percent of the cases was mistaken eyewitness
identification testimony, but in more than one third of the exonerations, flawed
forensic evidence other than DNA, played a role."l 04 The report went on to say
that "[p]articularly problematic was expert testimony based on microscopic hair
analysis that was admitted in a number of cases in which courts later vacated the
convictions on the basis of DNA testing."105
Although many studies point to incorrect eyewitness identification as
the chief cause for wrongful convictions,106 the Rules of Evidence are well
equipped to deal with this situation. The trier of fact, usually the jury, has the
opportunity to evaluate the witness first hand, and the defense has the opportuni-
ty to zealously cross examine that witness.' 7 While the same is true for forensic
101 Margaret A. Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the Criminal Justice System, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICs 320, 321 (2006).
102 Id.
103 See In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501
(W. Va. 1993).
104 Berger, supra note 101, at 321.
Unlike techniques like ballistics, fingerprinting, or bitemark analysis which
were developed and exist solely in the world of forensics, forensic DNA pro-
filing is the fortuitous byproduct of cutting edge science. Consequently, emi-
nent scientists participated from the first in validating DNA testing for foren-
sic use. They quickly realized that the practices followed in many crime la-
boratories were considerably less stringent than the standards scientists em-
ploy in conducting research. By the 1990s, two committees convened by the
National Research Council stressed the need for laboratories to develop pro-
cedures that would minimize the risk of error.
Id.
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 See FED. R. EvID. 611(b); W. VA. R. EviD. 611(b).
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expert witness testimony, 1os there is often a presumption of correctness and
trustworthiness for the expert on behalf of the jury. As discussed below, the jury
presumes that scientific proof means guilt.109
Although DNA testing is much more reliable than hair analysis, there is
no accounting for fraudulent evidence. "DNA testing is now done routinely and
is correctly viewed as the most remarkable forensic tool we have ever had. But
DNA testing can operate as the gold standard only if the laboratory's work is
correctly done."110 Just as DNA can be the gold standard to hold all forensic
sciences up to in terms of standardization and reliability, the fraud of Fred Zain
can be the blank enzyme plate by which to evaluate the scientist or forensic ex-
aminer for fraud. Forensic science is only as reliable and trustworthy as the ex-
aminer.
3. An Irrebuttable Presumption of Guilt
Once scientific evidence is produced in a case by the state through tes-
timony of an expert, whether DNA analysis, hair analysis, or fraudulently manu-
factured "mumbo-jumbo," there is a heightened level of trustworthiness for the
expert on the part of the jury. This elevated level of trust for the witness can be
insurmountable for the defense."' "According to one study, '[a]bout one quar-
ter of the citizens who had served on juries which were presented with scientific
evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have changed
their verdicts-from guilty to not guilty."' 2 The heightened level of trustwor-
thiness on the part of the jury for a forensic science expert creates an irrebutta-
ble presumption of guilt in the minds of the jury. As one article stated, "only
forensic evidence claims to be beyond the pale of human error, and thus inher-
ently trustworthy."' 3
Once forensic evidence is admitted, "there appears to be little that can
be done to undermine its impact."'1 4 The traditional means of countering such
evidence is for the criminal defense to conduct a strong cross examination of the
108 Recognizing that "[a]ppellate courts often cite the fact that the cross-examination of the
prosecution expert was effective as a reason why a defense expert was not needed," Giannelli
refers to this proposition as an "underlying myth." Giannelli, supra note 35, at 1376.
109 See infra Part III.A.3.
110 Berger, supra note 101, at 322.
I See for example, the discussion of Glen Dale Woodall's conviction and the Fred Zain affair
in infra Part I1I.D.
112 Giannelli, supra note 34, at 541 (quoting J.L. Peterson et al., The Use and Effects of Foren-
sic Science in the Adjudication ofFelony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC ScI. 1730, 1748 (1987)).
113 J. Herbie Difonzo & Ruth C. Stem, Devil in a White Coat: The Temptation of Forensic
Evidence in the Age of CSI, 41 NEw ENG. L. REv. 503, 514 (2007) (emphasis omitted).
114 Michael J. Saks & D. Michael Risinger, Baserates, the Presumption of Guilt, Admissibility
Rulings, and Erroneous Convictions, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1051, 1062 (2003).
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state's expert plus present a rebuttal expert.115 Research of jurors has "found that
none of it made much difference. Once the expert evidence was in, nothing un-
did its effects more than marginally."" 6
A presumption shifts the burden of establishing evidence to the oppos-
ing party to rebut the initial presumption.' '7 Presumptions of fact can be rebut-
ted by other evidence or circumstances to the contrary.' 8 A presumption of law,
however, is irrebuttable in West Virginia." 9 "[A] presumption of law is a rule of
law that a particular inference shall be drawn by a court or jury from a particular
circumstance." 20 Forensic scientific evidence creates a presumption in the
minds of the jury: the defendant committed the crime because the scientific ex-
pert told me the defendant was at the crime scene. Because this presumption is
virtually insurmountable for the defendant, forensic scientific evidence at trial
creates a presumption of guilt in the minds of the jury. The burden then shifts to
the defendant to disprove it, which is virtually impossible.121
In West Virginia, jurors are not instructed to presume guilt when pre-
sented with forensic evidence.122 In fact, the only presumption jurors are in-
structed about in a criminal trial is the presumption of innocence.123 The Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has ruled that "[i]n a criminal prose-
cution, it is constitutional error to give an instruction which supplies by pre-
11 See supra Part II.A. 1.
116 Saks & Risinger, supra note 114.
" See State v. O'Connell, 256 S.E.2d 429,431 (W. Va. 1979).
118 McGinnis v. Curry, 13 W. Va. 29 (1878); see also Dwight v. Hazlett, 147 S.E. 877, 880
(W. Va. 1929) ("[A]s the rule is based on a presumption [of fact], the rule becomes impotent
whenever the presumption is seasonably rebutted."). Establishing contrary facts effectively rebuts
a presumption. Id.
119 Holley v. Purity Baking Co., 37 S.E.2d 729, 733 (W. Va. 1946) ("A presumption of law,
unlike a presumption of fact, cannot be rebutted.").
120 Id. (quoting State v. Dodds, 46 S.E. 228, 231 (W. Va. 1903)).
121 See, e.g., O'Connell, 256 S.E.2d at 431 ("The problem with the use of the word 'presume'
in the instruction in question is that it implicitly establishes a fact necessary for conviction-intent
to kill-which fact remains established unless the defendant can rebut it with proof to the contra-
ry. This is a constitutionally impermissible shifting of burden of proof"); see also People v.
Brown, 769 N.E.2d 1266, 1274 (N.Y. 2002) ("Thus, in this case, the introduction of expert testi-
mony was prejudicial, first, because it nullified the presumption of innocence by replacing it with
a presumption of guilt in which the jury was given information on how defendant got rid of
marked money and drugs. Moreover, the introduction of the expert testimony shifted the burden of
proof from the prosecution to the defendant, requiring her to explain why the expert's statements
did not apply to her and leaving the jury to conclude that she had no explanation.").
122 W. VA. CRIMINAL LAW RESEARCH CTR., W. VA. PUB. DEFENDER SERV., WEST VIRGINIA
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7 (6th ed. 2003),
http://www.wvpds.org/Jury/ 20lnstructions/Jury/ 20Instruction%206.pdf.
123 Id. Specifically, the model jury instructions state, "The Court instructs the jury that the law
presumes a defendant in a criminal case to be innocent of crime. Thus, a defendant, although
accused, begins the trial with a 'clean slate'-with no evidence against him." Id.
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sumption any material element of the crime charged."1 24 Jurors in West Virginia
are, however, instructed that they "are the sole judges of the 'credibility' or 'be-
lievability' of each witness."1 25 Jurors are also instructed that the meaning of
"'credibility of a witness' means the truthfulness or lack of truthfulness of a
witness." 2 6 This is where the juror makes a presumption. The state's forensic
science expert is given higher credibility and presumed a higher level of truth-
fulness. In other words, jurors expect experts to tell the truth. They expect to
rely on the testimony of an expert, to be taught by the expert, even in the wake
of Fred Zain.
On appeal, this presumption continues. Many courts on appeal will as-
sume that such scientific evidence is valid.12 7 In State v. Woodall, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia went so far as to say of the jury in that case
that "[tlhere is no reason to believe that the jury here was unfairly swayed by the
grandeur of science .... 2 As discussed in Part III.D, however, that is exactly
what happened. Glen Dale Woodall was wrongly convicted based on fraudulent
scientific evidence, and on appeal, the court accepted the validity of the evi-
dence.129
At the trial court level, a judge in West Virginia may take judicial notice
of a test's reliability.130 If a senior appellate court has concluded that a scientific
"test is generally accepted by the scientific community, a trial court may take
judicial notice of [that] test's reliability."'31 One commentator pointed out that
many forensic techniques, however, achieved this general acceptance from
courts before the more demanding Daubert standards.' 3 2 Because empirical
support for some of these now accepted techniques is lacking, research on these
techniques is a pressing concern.13 3 For example, hair analysis has been used in
trials for more than a century, and through research, the scientific community
124 O'Connell, 256 S.E.2d at 431.
125 W. VA. CRIMINAL LAW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 122, at 9.
126 Id.
127 See State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 261 (W. Va. 1989).
128 Id.
129 See In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501,
519 n.34 (W. Va. 1993).
130 "[U]nder Rule 702, there is a category of expert testimony based on scientific methodology
that is so longstanding and generally recognized that it may be judicially noticed, and, therefore, a
trial court need not ascertain the basis for its reliability." Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203
(W. Va. 1993). In announcing the Daubert standard as applicable to the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, the court stated, "Daubert is directed at situations where the scientific or technical basis
for the expert testimony cannot be judicially noticed and a hearing must be held to determine its
reliability." Id.
131 See Syl. pt. 1, State v. Thomas, 421 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1992).
132 Giannelli, supra note 34, at 536.
133 Id
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found that it is not as reliable as once thought. 134 "To put the point more bluntly:
if the state does not test the scientific evidence with which it seeks to convict
defendants, it should forfeit the right to use it."' 35 Because of the irrebuttable
presumption of guilt the testifying forensic expert gives to the jury and because
many forensic science techniques are now questionable under the Daubert
standard, treatment of forensic evidence at trial needs significant improvement.
B. The CSI Effect
One of the most cited articles on the subject of the CSI effect deter-
mined that the CSI effect is plausible; however, it has never been proven empir-
ically. 136 Author Tom Tyler found the phenomenon plausible because it has
been proven that juries are influenced by mass media, and jurors are very rarely
able to put aside their preconceptions; therefore, it is likely that jurors who
watch the program are influenced by it.13 7 Tyler also found several other plausi-
ble alternative explanations for the allegedly increasing acquittal rate that has
led to the speculation of the CSI effect: juries may (1) have increased sympathy
for the accused, (2) be less likely to convict than those in the legal community
expect them to be, and (3) have a declining trust and confidence in the courts
and the law that make them less likely to convict.'3 8 Tyler concludes that "[t]he
effect may exist, but it may not be a CSI effect."l 39 So, if it is possible, the ques-
tion turns to what would an empirical study of jurors find?
1. An Empirical Study: The Unicorn, the Mermaid, and the CSI
Effect
One empirical study of juror perceptions and expectations was conduct-
ed by a felony trial judge in Michigan, Judge Donald E. Shelton.1 40 To answer
questions about juror expectations of scientific evidence and whether or not
these expectations were related to watching any law-related television shows,
two surveys were conducted with actual summoned jurors in Ann Arbor and
Detroit, Michigan.14 1 In all 2246 jurors were surveyed.142 "[T]he survey was
administered to summoned jurors prior to jury selection or any preliminary in-
134 NAS REPORT, supra note 94, at 161.
' Giannelli, supra note 34, at 541 (quoting MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 139 (2001)).
136 Tyler, supra note 5, at 1053.
13 Id. at 1056, 1060.
13 Id. at 1084-85.
19 Id. at 1085.
140 See Shelton, supra note 2, at 1 n.al.
141 Id. at 5.
142 Id.
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struction. The jurors were assured that the survey was anonymous and that it
was unrelated to their potential selection as a juror in any case."1 4 3 The survey
asked jurors to answer questions about their television viewing habits and
whether or not they would demand scientific evidence before finding a defend-
ant guilty.'" In his analysis of the data compiled through the juror surveys,
Judge Shelton concluded that "[1]ike the unicorn and the mermaid, the CSI Ef-
fect is a myth."l 45
Although the survey uncovered that jurors do have an expectation of
scientific evidence in criminal trials, Judge Shelton found the reason for that
demand had more to do with society's technological advances than a juror's
television viewing habits. 146 He called this advancement in public awareness of
the use of modem technology and its availability in criminal proceedings the
"tech effect." 4 7 Judge Shelton also theorized that jurors' expectations for scien-
tific evidence is not only derived solely from the "tech effect" but also from
broad portrayals of the criminal justice system in all types of media, the "media
effect," and the extent to which lawyers and judges bring their beliefs about the
CSI effect to trial.148 "[T]hese forces act in combination to influence juror ex-
pectations and demands for forensic-science evidence." 49
Now, more than ever before, the average juror is aware of the technolo-
gy and science available in criminal prosecutions. Although the educated, mod-
ern juror may not be directly linked to television programming, it can be said
that "juror expectations and demands for scientific evidence are the result of
broader changes in our popular culture, fostered by the mass media and by liti-
gants' beliefs that the effect exists."150 Jurors expect that at trial both sides will
"obtain and present the scientific evidence that technology has made possi-
ble." '5
The new, modem juror, with an iPhone and a laptop, should not be
viewed by either side as a negative (as long as he or she brings neither to court).
"43 Id.
'" Id. at 6.
145 Id. at 23. But see N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About
Forensic Science Affects the Public's Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 JURIMETRICS
J. 357, 363 (2007) (conducting their own empirical study, the authors concluded that "CSI leads
viewers to expect hightech science and something more than the intuition of the witness, so that
when in court they are presented with much lower-tech science and the witness's subjective judg-
ment, they are likely to find it less convincing than do non-CSI-viewers. To this extent, our data
support the claims of those who have argued that the CSI effect increases the prosecution's bur-
den.").
146 Shelton, supra note 2, at 23.
147 id
148 Id. at 30.
149 Id.
1so Id. at 34.
151 Id.
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"The criminal-justice system must find ways to adapt to, rather than fight
against, this new, more modem juror."l 52 As discussed later, there are lessons
that can be learned and adapted in the laboratory as well as the courtroom in
order for the modern justice system to adapt to a new educated juror who de-
mands more forensic evidence.
2. The Media Effect
Other scholars have furthered the media effect argument by claiming
that the CSI effect is a myth created by the media.15 1 Some scholars have sug-
gested that we can gain insight into this new phenomenon by looking at another
point when media and law intersected: the supposed litigation crisis or the litiga-
tion explosion. 5 4 As some scholars argue, "the CSI effect is not the first time
that American media has been accused of having perpetuated beliefs about the
legal system that are not supported by empirical data." 5 5
Since the 1970s, the media has reported a crisis in America, a crisis sur-
rounding the civil legal system.'5 6 It was reported that more cases were filed,
more disproportionate damages were awarded, and that the legal system was out
of control as compared to the legal systems in other similar countries.'57 This
supposed crisis, however, has been largely "debunked."'5 8 Both the litigation
crisis and the CSI effect echo a similar distrust of juries by the media.'"9 Some
would suggest that the CSI effect has resounded with the legal community be-
cause it "would seem to embody the law's anxiety about the threat to its legiti-
macy as a truth-producing institution posed by a rival truth-producing institute
called 'science."', 60 Regardless of the reasoning behind their belief, many crim-
inal trial lawyers insist that the CSI effect is alive and well in their court-
rooms.161
152 Id.
153 Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the 'CSI Effect' Effect: Media and
Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1335 (2009). "The term CSI effect appears to
have entered the popular lexicon late in 2002 in an article in Time magazine. . . . The term ap-
peared a couple of times the following year and more in 2004. In 2005, media coverage of the CSI
effect exploded." Id at 1338.
154 Id. at 1341.
155 Id.
157 Id. at 1342.
158 Id
159 Id. at 1373.
160 Id
161 See infra Part III.B.3.
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3. The CSI Effect Through the Eyes of a Criminal Lawyer and the
Burden of Proof
Several published reports and studies surveying criminal trial lawyers
determined the CSI effect is very real to lawyers and judges in the field.16 2 On
June 30, 2005, the Maricopa County, Arizona, Attorney's Office published such
a study.163 In the study, the Attorney's Office surveyed prosecutors and defense
attorneys who practice within the county and found that these attorneys feel the
significant influences of television shows like CSI.16 One prosecutor observed,
I had a drug case ... where the officer saw the defendant throw
down a baggie of drugs. The baggie was not fingerprinted as the
backlog [for laboratory testing] was almost six months at the
time. After the trial, the jury complained that the lack of finger-
print evidence suggested that the baggie could have been there
all along.165
The study also discussed other cases in which attorneys felt the effect
was dispositive. 166 In one case, the defendant was prosecuted for drugs that were
found in a cigarette pack in his pocket.167 Although the defendant admitted that
the pack was his, he denied that he ever had possession of the drugs.16 8 After
admitting that he watched CSI, the foreperson claimed that the investigators
should have conducted "extensive fingerprinting, DNA testing, and other foren-
sic" testing.169 The foreperson had convinced the entire jury that the prosecution
did not do enough to prove its case. 170 In another case, the jury acquitted the
defendant for theft even though the victim saw the man steal his radio from his
car.17' After the trial, the jurors said the investigators should have taken finger-
prints and that the prosecution did not give them enough credit for "being
smart." 72
162 See, e.g., MCAO, supra note 2.
163 Id.
'6 Id at 5.
165 Id at 6. The author, while working as a summer law clerk, witnessed a similar case first
hand. The case involved a federal prisoner accused of possessing marijuana and a homemade
weapon, a shank, in a federal prison. Even though two officers from the facility testified that they
confiscated a bag of marijuana and a shank from the defendant, the jury refised to convict the
defendant because there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence presented by the prosecution.
166 Id. at 7.
167 id.
168 id.
169 Id
170 Id
'1 Id at 7-8.
172 Id
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In 2006, Andrew Thomas, the chief prosecutor for Maricopa County,
responded to Tyler's article with an article of his own.173 Thomas explains "the
false expectation of plentiful scientific evidence can create a bias in the jury if
this issue is not properly addressed at trial." 7 4 The high expectations of jurors
created by fictional shows such as CSI cannot be met by the limited resources in
real prosecutors' offices. 175 Moreover, Thomas claims that prosecutors are wor-
ried that justice is not being done. 7 6
Often there is very little physical or scientific evidence in criminal cas-
es; however, jurors now demand that there be more than eye-witness testimony,
victim testimony, or confessions. 77 Even in jurisdictions that have these sophis-
ticated techniques, prosecutors argue that the resources are so scarce and costly
that they are reserved for the most serious crimes.178 The majority of prosecu-
tions, however, are for low-level criminal offenses such as theft, drug posses-
sion, and assault.179 Unlike the more serious crimes, such as murder, these cases
are generally not given valuable forensic resources. 80 Consequently, there is
little or no science to support the claims of the prosecution and "[t]hese cases
bear the brunt of the CSI effect because these cases often do not yield irrefutable
physical or scientific evidence of guilt or innocence."isi
Surveys also indicated that many prosecutors believe this heightened
demand for scientific evidence has elevated the burden of proof in criminal cas-
es from "beyond a reasonable doubt" to something closer to beyond all or any
doubt. 182 Some scholars theorize that prosecutors are concerned because science
has a more stringent burden of proof than the law. 183 Therefore, if scientific evi-
dence is required for a conviction in every case, this vicariously elevates the
prosecutor's legal burden of proof to that of the scientific burden of proof.18 4
Others also claim an elevated burden of proof for the prosecution by pointing to
17 Andrew P. Thomas, The CSI Effect: Fact or Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 70 (Mar.
2006), available at http://yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/32.pdf.
174 Id. at 70.
17s Id. at 70-71.
176 Id. at 70.
177 MCAO, supra note 2, at 6.
178 Id.
179 id.
1 Id ("While some jurisdictions have access to some of the 'bells and whistles' equipment
depicted in television dramas, those resources are scarce and are usually reserved for the most
serious crimes.").
181 Id.
182 See Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, CSI and Its Effects: Media, Juries, and the Bur-
den ofProof 41 NEW ENG. L. REv. 435, 465-66 (2007).
183 Id
184 See id
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the fact that no amount of forensic evidence can prove mens rea.' 85 A finger-
print does not prove intent, but the lack of such scientific evidence can seriously
hamper the prosecution's case. 186 Even if the scientific standard of proof is met
with forensic evidence, the prosecution still has to prove intent for a conviction.
As discussed below, however, this forensic demand can ultimately be
more damaging for the defense. Whatever the name-tech effect, CSI effect, the
media effect-there is little doubt amongst criminal trial lawyers that the mod-
em juror demands more forensic evidence at trial. This heightened demand cou-
pled with the heightened level of trustworthiness the jury gives to a testifying
forensic expert makes instances of fraud in the forensic community particularly
troubling.
C. Forensic Due Process for the Indigent Defendant
As the demand for scientific evidence grows to gain convictions, so too
may the propensity for pseudo-science, expert bolstering, and fraudulent evi-
dence. Because of this enticement to fraudulently produce scientific evidence
and the defendant's usual inability to acquire a rebuttal forensic expert, the
modem juror's demand for forensic evidence has a stronger possibility of harm-
ing the criminal defendant.
In our adversarial system, the most important check on fraudulent ex-
pert witness testimony offered by the prosecution is for the defense to hire its
own expert. But this can be a very costly proposition, especially for an indigent
defendant. More often than not, the indigent defendant is not given enough
funding for forensic expert witnesses.' Federal and state funding for defense
experts must be increased to afford defendants due process."'
Courts have often recognized the disadvantages an indigent defendant
faces in mounting a full defense.'89 What if the defense is unable to afford its
own forensic testing or experts? What happens when the state forensic lab re-
fuses to turn over evidence to the defense due to fear that it will be damaged?
The answer may be a wrongful conviction because there can be no equality in
justice if the defense is not given equal access to experts and evidence.' 90
1ss Dennis J. Stevens, CSI Effect, Prosecutors, and Wrongful Convictions, 45 No. 4 CRIM. L.
BULL. art. 2 (2009).
186 See id.
187 See supra text accompanying note 35.
188 "[T]he Act's $1,000 limit for defense experts is far too low. . . and must be increased if due
process is to be afforded to defendants." Giannelli, supra note 34, at 539 (quoting J.B. Weinstein,
Science and the Challenge of Expert Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REv. 1005, 1008
(1995)).
189 "[A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because of poverty to parry
by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him." Reilly v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y.
1929).
190 Giannelli, supra note 34, at 539.
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Prosecutors have access to all the powers and resources of the state
crime labs.19' Although prosecutors may argue these resources are not always
used because of funding and time constraints, it is the access itself that creates a
disparity in the resources available to the defense. This disparity establishes "'an
economic presumption of guilt."'l 92 Competing experts in criminal trials can
serve not only the interests of due process and equality in justice but also as a
quality control device for forensic examiners.193 Laboratory examiners are more
likely to follow proper protocol when they know that outside experts will review
their work.194 Many indigent defendants are now making well-founded argu-
ments to trial courts in support of funding for forensic experts. 195 Malcolm Rent
Johnson in particular argued that a forensic expert was part of the "'raw materi-
als integral to the presentation of an adequate defense."'l 96 The court, however,
did not agree.197
1. Malcolm Rent Johnson and "Black Magic"
Malcolm Rent Johnson's story, if true, is tragic. He was convicted of
the rape and murder of an elderly woman in her Oklahoma City apartment and
was sentenced to death.19 8 Arguably, Johnson was a good suspect; he was a
convicted felon.'99 His convictions included two rapes. 20 0 The evidence used to
convict him at trial were items of the victim's clothing found at his apartment
and the testimony of forensic expert Joyce Gilchrist.2 0 1 Gilchrist was known in
the local legal community by the nickname "Black Magic" because she could
191 See Giannelli, supra note 35, at 1327. As Giannelli discusses, "expert assistance generally is
not difficult for the prosecution. There are over 300 crime laboratories in this country, and state
prosecutors typically have access to the services of state, county, regional, or metropolitan crime
laboratories." Id.
192 Giannelli, supra note 34, at 539 (quoting Marcia Coyle et al., Trial and Error in the Na-
tion's Death Belt: Fatal Defense, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 38).
193 Id
194 Id
1 See, e.g., infra Part III.C.
196 Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 76 (1985) (citations omitted)).
197 Id. at 1247 ("[P]etitioner's proffered expert rebuttal evidence does not purport to show that
he could not have committed the crime. Therefore, upon review of the record we conclude that
petitioner fails to show that denial of his request for expert assistance substantially prejudiced his
case at the guilt phase of trial.").
198 Id. at 1244.
199 Id. ("The court submitted three aggravating circumstances for the jury's consideration: (1)
prior conviction of a felony; (2) continuing threat to society; and (3) especially heinous, cruel, or
atrocious killing. The jury rejected the third aggravator but found that the other two outweighed
the evidence of mitigation. Petitioner was sentenced to death.").
200 id.
201 Id
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202tetfdfind traces of evidence where there seemingly was none. Gilchrist testified
that semen found on the bed at the victim's apartment matched Johnson's blood
type and that strands of hair found at the scene were consistent with Johnson's
hair.203
At trial, Johnson's counsel sought funds from the court to secure a de-
fense forensic expert to rebut the "Black Magic"-the testimony of Joyce
Gilchrist. The trial court denied the request, and after conviction on habeas re-
lief, the federal district court as well as the Tenth Circuit refused to overturn
Johnson's conviction on this basis. 204 The Tenth Circuit denied Johnson's ap-
peal because the forensic expert testimony proposed did not go beyond the level
of mere speculation.205 The court stated that "[o]ther than merely undermining
certain aspects of the prosecution's forensic evidence, however, petitioner's
proffered expert rebuttal evidence does not purport to show that he could not
,,206have committed the crime. After exhausting all the legal relief available to
him, Malcolm Rent Johnson was executed on January 6, 2000.207
Just a few months later, however, the house of cards came crashing
down for Joyce Gilchrist, the star witness at Johnson's trial. On July 30, 2001, a
fellow forensic examiner re-examined the slides used in the Johnson case and
found no sperm present.2 08 This finding was confirmed by three other scientists
in the lab. 209 Gilchrist has also been accused of "repeatedly overstating court-
room testimony and performing shoddy forensic analysis." 2 10 Malcolm Rent
Johnson went to his grave professing his innocence.
2. Glen Dale Woodall and More Denial
Like Johnson, Glen Dale Woodall was also a convenient suspect con-
victed with the help of questionable forensic science. 2 11 Also like Johnson,
Glen Dale Woodall was also not a wealthy defendant; Woodall's family sup-
ported his defense and raised money for further DNA testing in his case by hav-
ing bake sales and craft sales.212 Although ultimately it was the advancement of
202 David Kohn, Under the Microscope, CBS NEWS 60 MINUTES (Feb. 11, 2009, 9:26 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/05/08/60II/main290046.shtml.
203 Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1244.
204 Id. at 1246.
205 Id at 1247.
206 Id
207 Police Chemist Is Rebutted After Man's Execution, supra note 47.
208 Id
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See infra Part III.D for a full discussion of this case.
212 Tony Rutherford, Former News Anchor Recalls 'Mall Rapist'Saga, Falsely Convicted Man
'Victim' Too, HUNTINGTONNEWS.NET (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.huntingtonnews.net/local/101025-rutherford-localmallrapist.html.
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new DNA techniques that allowed for a profile to be drawn from a smaller sam-
ple that set Woodall free, he was denied the opportunity to have a DNA test
performed before his initial trial even began.213 In the pretrial hearing, he was
denied a DNA test because the defense could not provide an expert witness to
attest to the validity and reliability of DNA testing; they simply could not afford
it.214
These two cases illustrate the insurmountable obstacles indigent de-
fendants face when confronted with forensic evidence, especially fraudulent
forensic evidence. One man may well have been executed for a crime he did not
commit while the other helped expose the biggest evidentiary fraud in West
Virginia history.
D. The Fred Zain Affair
Fred Zain was a serology superstar in West Virginia. He was a prosecu-
tor's dream, miraculously finding evidence where there seemingly was none,
magically discovering microscopic drops of blood or semen, conclusively prov-
ing beyond all doubt that the defendant was guilty just like it happens on televi-
sion. 2 15 Fred Zain was a one-man justice machine. He was known for pulling off
the impossible in record time, and he eventually moved to Texas to expand his
career.2 16 However, "[e]ven after Zain left the state, West Virginia prosecutors
sent him evidence to examine because they could no longer get the 'right' re-
sults from their own crime lab."2 17 There was just one problem: Fred Zain was a
complete fraud.
1. The Case That Exposed the Fraud
It was the case of a gravedigger from Huntington that exposed Fred
Zain as a fraud. Glen Dale Woodall was a convenient suspect, and the case was
as high-profile as you can get in a small town. The crimes in question had the
residents of the City of Huntington looking over their shoulders in fear of the
boogieman, for answers, and a quick conviction.218 It was Zain who got to step
213 See State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 259 (W. Va. 1989).
214 See infra Part IlI.D.L
215 Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 212 n.4 (W. Va. 1993) (Neely, J., concurring on the
judgment but not on the opinion of the court).
216 Id. ("[T]his Court chronicled Trooper Zain's long history of falsifying evidence as a serolo-
gy expert in criminal cases to obtain convictions for the prosecution.").
217 Giannelli, supra note 96.
218 See Rutherford, supra note 212 ("'People just did not want to go to the mall. It was really a
panic situation [then],' Ms. Brown recalled. Complicating accurate coverage of the incidents,
'people could not tell the rumors from what was true. There was chaos and upheaval for people
working there."').
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in and play the role of star, expert witness for the prosecution.2 19 Woodall would
say years later of Zain that he "was just too eager to get on the stand . . .. It was
just the way he would sit up there. You could tell he was really enjoying his job,
to help the prosecution get convictions."22 0
The saga began in 1987 on two different snowy nights in Huntington,
West Virginia.221 The Huntington area was gripped in fear after two women had
been abducted from the Huntington Mall parking lot in Barboursville, West
Virginia, brutally raped, and then released by their attacker.222 The local media
termed the unknown assailant the "Mall Rapist." 2 23 At trial, both victims de-
224 ds
scribed in horrific detail their stories. Each discussed similar nights of terror
only a month apart: both were abducted at knifepoint, forced to perform fellatio,
sodomized, and raped.225 The victim's accounts were not disputed; the only
question at trial was the identity of the suspect.226
At the time of his arrest, twenty-nine-year-old Glen Woodall was a
groundskeeper at the cemetery across the street from the mall, White Chapel
Memorial Gardens.227 He owned pants and boots similar to those described by
the victims as worn by the Mall Rapist during the attacks, he was uncircumcised
as was the assailant, and he had a distinctive smell.228
At trial, Woodall's defense was no match for the state's forensic star,
Fred Zain. The jury chose to believe the expert, Zain, over the defendant. "The
defendant's case consisted largely of alibi testimony, which the jury rejected.
The prosecution's case consisted primarily of circumstantial evidence, which,
taken together, the jury found convincing." 22 9 Zain's role in the case included
"blood analysis of the defendant, compared to semen samples recovered from
the victims . . . [and] body hair and beard hair from the defendant compared to
hair recovered from the car where victim one was attacked." 23 0 On July 8, 1987,
less than six months after the first rape, which occurred on January 22, 1987, the
219 See id.
220 Andrew Clevenger, DNA Match Found in 1987 Huntington Mall Rapes, WVGAZETTE.COM
(Oct. 22, 2010), http://wvgazette.com/News/201010220534?page=2.
221 State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 256-57 (W. Va. 1989); see also Mall Rape Timeline,
HERALD-DISPATCH (Oct. 28, 2010, 12:05 AM), http://www.herald-
dispatch.com/news/x98370945 1/No-Headline ("Both victims testified they were attacked on
snowy nights and were attacked while getting into their cars in the mall parking lot.").
222 Rutherford, supra note 212.
223 See, e.g., id.
224 Woodall, 385 S.E.2d at 257-58.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 258.
227 Mall Rape Timeline, supra note 221.
228 Woodall, 385 S.E.2d at 258. Both victims testified that there was a distinctive smell about
the Mall Rapist that investigators also claimed to have found at Woodall's work place. Id.
229 id
230 Id
2012] 1183
29
Griebel: Fred Zain, the CSI Effect, and a Philosophical Idea of Justice: U
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012
WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW
jury deliberated only three hours and returned with a conviction for Woodall
with the help of the evidence proffered by Zain.2 3 1 The verdict was delivered to
a packed crowd of over 100 spectators in the courtroom.2 32 Later that summer,
Woodall was sentenced to the maximum: "two life terms without parole and 203
to 335 years, all to be served consecutively." 2 33
Woodall's conviction was affirmed on appeal;234 however, in a subse-
quent habeas corpus proceeding, a DNA test ordered by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia "conclusively established" that Woodall could not
have committed the crimes for which he was convicted.235 In 1992, his convic-
tion was overturned after he served four years in prison and a year under elec-
tronic home confinement.2 36 After his release, Woodall settled his civil lawsuit
against the state for false imprisonment for one million dollars, and he returned
237to Huntington to carry out the rest of his life in peace.
2. A New Mall Rapist Suspect
Even after his release, however, many in the Huntington community
doubted Woodall's innocence. 23 8 According to a former local news anchor who
is now an attorney, the victims found it especially hard to accept Woodall's in-
nocence. 239 In a recent interview about the Woodall case, the news anchor said,
The day they brought Glen back from Moundsville, one of the
victims pounded her fist on the vehicle they had brought him
back in . . .. [She] had been told "the jury convicted him." She
could not believe that they were going to let him go. She was
scared, frightened out of her mind that they were letting the guy
who did this to her go. I don't think she understood science.240
231 Mall Rape Timeline, supra note 221.
232 Id.
233 Woodall, 385 S.E.2d at 259.
234 See id at 265.
235 In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 509
(W. Va. 1993).
236 Glen Woodall (Huntington, West Virginia), DNA INITIATIVE,
http://www.dna.gov/postconviction/convictedexonerated/woodall (last visited Apr. 4, 2012)
(excerpt from EDWARD CONNORS, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFTER TRIAL 74-76 (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf).
237 See Clevenger, supra note 220; Mall Rape Timeline, supra note 221.
231 Rutherford, supra note 212.
239 Id.
240 id.
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Over two decades after the brutal attacks, a Cabell County grand jury
charged a Kanawha County man with the crimes in October 20 10.241 Thanks to
DNA testing, the grand jury was able to charge a new suspect with the crime,
Donald Eugene Good, who was already serving a life sentence in prison.2 4 2
Good is "serving time at the Mount Olive Correctional Center for the killing of
a St. Albans man in November 1992."243 Convicted felons in West Virginia are
required to provide DNA samples, and Good's DNA matched the DNA profile
from the Mall Rapist case. 2 "
Woodall's attorney, Lonnie Simmons, fought for years to have DNA
testing done in his case at a time when the science was just developing. 245 Sim-
mons himself informed Woodall of the charges against Good and stated about
the whole ordeal "[i]t shows the value of science . . . . With this kind of evi-
dence, you have actual objective facts. And those objective facts can be tested
and reviewed by other scientists. You eliminate some of the problems you have
with eyewitness testimony and witnesses' memory." 2 46 It is ironic, however, that
it was fraudulent science that put Woodall away and reliable science that set him
free.
3. A Systematic Practice of Manufactured Evidence
After the Woodall case, an unprecedented investigation, conducted at
the request of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, exposed miscon-
duct on the part of Zain that was "the result of systematic practice rather than an
occasional inadvertent error." 2 4 7 The court concluded that Zain's misconduct not
only constituted new evidence in the trials where his work was material to a
conviction but also constituted a violation of due process for the defendants. 248
The court stated that "[t]he matters brought before this Court . . . are shocking
and represent egregious violations of the right of a defendant to a fair trial. They
stain our judicial system and mock the ideal of justice under law." 24 9 The report
found many acts of misconduct on the part of Zain:
241 Clevenger, supra note 220.
242 Id.
243 Mall Rape Timeline, supra note 221.
244 Clevenger, supra note 220.
245 Id.
246 id.
247 In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 516
(W. Va. 1993) (citations omitted).
248 Id. at 504.
249 id.
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(1) overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the fre-
quency of genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3)
misreporting the frequency of genetic matches on multiple piec-
es of evidence; (4) reporting the multiple items had been tested,
when only a single item had been tested; (5) reporting inconclu-
sive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory
records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression
that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested;
(8) failing to report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or
to report conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting re-
sults; (10) implying a match with a suspect when testing sup-
ported only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting scientif-
ically impossible or improbable results.250
Some of Zain's co-workers reported seeing him recording results from
blank enzyme test plates 251 and stated that he criticized them for being too con-
servative.252 Others claimed only that he "sometimes reported findings that they
would not have."253 In almost every case that was reviewed in the investigation,
fraud was discovered. 25 4 "Although individual cases of fraud have been uncov-
ered at various times in crime labs throughout the country, the Zain case appears
to be the first time that an appellate court has discredited a forensic scientist's
entire career and authorized the reopening, in habeas corpus proceedings, of
every case that the forensic scientist handled." 255 This case was monumental for
not only West Virginia but also the entire country.
250 Id. at 516.
251 Id. at 511.
Moreland and Midkiff testified that Zain became their supervisor in 1979 or in
the early 1980s. They testified that during their employment, particularly in
the later years, they observed Zain recording on his worksheet results from
enzyme test plates which appeared to them and to other employees, including
State Police Officer Blake, Zain's supervisor, to be blank. Midkiff estimated
that she had observed at least 100 instances of such conduct, stating such oc-
currences became routine over the years and were known in the other divi-
sions of the State Police crime lab.
Id.
252 Id. at 511-12 n.11.
253 Id. at 512.
254 Castelle, supra note 3, at 13. The investigation examined 134 cases, and "[t]he report cited
Zain's impropriety in at least 37 rape and murder cases." Mall Rape Timeline, supra note 221. By
2002, "West Virginia had paid at least $6.5 million to settle lawsuits from wrongfully convicted
defendants." Id.
255 Mall Rape Timeline, supra note 221.
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4. The Victims
Was it fame? Was it money? Was it the attention he received while
playing the role of star witness for the prosecution? Was it a misguided philo-
sophical view of justice? We will likely never know what drove Fred Zain to
commit such systematic acts of fraud. Perhaps he thought he was serving the
greater good through his own view of justice, which may be the most frighten-
ing factor to imagine. The defendants who were the victims of his lies were
convenient; they were quite literally gravediggers and accused rapists. They
were individuals who lived on the outskirts of societal norms-individuals
whom society may be willing to lay the blame upon in the interest of quick,
efficient justice. They were presumed guilty, not innocent, and Zain manufac-
tured evidence to fit this presumption. Zain did not serve justice in most philo-
sophical senses of the word. In fact, he created more victims by misrepresenting
the evidence in this case. Not only did he help put an innocent man in prison,
but his misguided view of justice also allowed a rapist to roam the streets and
eventually kill a man.
No one would diminish what the two victims of the Mall Rapist experi-
enced. Zain furthered their pain by bringing false closure to horrible events. The
terror they experienced should not be discounted, but manufacturing evidence
through fraudulent pseudo-science served no purpose for the victims or the ac-
cused. Through his actions, Zain only victimized these women again. "Count-
less other criminal defendants faced Fred Zain in court during a 16-year career
that encompassed cases in at least eleven states."2 56 The full number of victims
of Zain's fraud may never fully be recompensed or known.
5. Lessons Learned
George Castelle, Chief Public Defender of Kanawha County, West Vir-
ginia, represented the interests of all West Virginia prisoners in the special in-
vestigation of Fred Zain by the court and many prisoners in the subsequent ha-
beas proceedings.257 In 1999, he wrote an article about his experiences titled
Lab Fraud: Lessons Learned from the Fred Zain Affair.258 He discussed four
important lessons for defense attorneys to take away from Zain: (1) fraudulent
forensic science is endemic; 2 59 (2) inadvertent error, sloppiness, exaggeration,
and biased forensic science are equally pervasive; 2 60 (3) untrustworthy forensic
science contaminates the seemingly independent non-scientific evidence; 261 and
256 Castelle, supra note 3, at 12.
257 Id
258 See id.
259 See id. at 13.
260 See id at 14.
261 Id.
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(4) untrustworthy forensic science can be caught and corrected.2 62 Criminal de-
fense lawyers must understand "that faulty forensic science contaminates more
than the scientific portion of the evidence-it is capable of contaminating the
entire case."263 And "[t]he abuses of Fred Zain and those like him simply could
not exist in a truly independent forensic science community, fostered in institu-
tions that carry out only scientific agendas."
All factors combined into a perfect storm to make the fraud of Fred Zain
and those like him possible, and if unchecked, will make this type of fraud pos-
sible, if not probable, to happen again. The modem juror's demand for more
forensic evidence places a burden on the prosecution to produce this evidence.
The prosecution, in turn, places that demand on its forensic examiners, who, in
the interest of justice, decide to exaggerate the results. Once at trial, the jury has
overwhelming trust in the expert examiner, who testifies at length about mysti-
fying scientific tools such as enzyme plates and microscopic characteristics. The
defense is unable to rebut this type of evidence with a forensic expert of its own
because it simply cannot afford one, and the court will not pay for it. Conse-
quently, the fraud goes unchecked for years.
E. A Collective Philosophical Definition ofJustice
The concerns of many in the legal community of the new technological-
ly-savvy juror and his or her effect on the evidentiary proof needed to convict an
accused are rooted in deep philosophical beliefs about fairness, justice, and the
law. Philosophical debates about justice founded the American Constitution, and
the authors were great students of history and developed the ideas of justice
upon which our country is founded from many great ancient Greek philoso-
phers, such as Socrates and Aristotle.26 5
In our modern criminal justice system, the jury process is one way in
which law is guided philosophically. Jurors evaluate facts to determine the
"truth" in a criminal trial; "[e]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on
justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." 26 6 A philos-
ophy regarding justice and fairness guides the way in which each juror evaluates
the law. "In a well-ordered society, then, the public conception of justice pro-
vides a mutually recognized point of view from which citizens can adjudicate
their claims of political right on their political institutions or against one anoth-
262 Id. at 16.
263 Id at 15.
264 JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 122 (2000).
265 "[T]here was a notion in Europe that Americans were proceeding, in their government, upon
Greek principles." CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 143 (1966).
266 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (1971).
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er." 26 7 Has the new era of technology altered our collective philosophical defini-
tion of justice?
No, society's collective philosophical idea of justice has not drastically
changed; in fact, it remains stable. "Since a well-ordered society endures over
time, its conception of justice is presumably stable .... 2 6 8 In contrast, our col-
lective idea of justice is supported by the new modem juror. The modem juror's
demand for all proof available at trial before denying an accused liberty is a
tenant of our idea of justice. An innocent man sent to prison is, for many, the
very definition of injustice. It was Aristotle who first proposed that one could
derive the meaning of justice from the meaning of injustice.269 If injustice is an
innocent man punished for a crime he did not commit; justice must be a guilty
man punished for a crime he did commit.
Although many people would disagree, some would argue that the con-
viction of one innocent man serves the need of social order and one innocent
person sent to prison or death is an acceptable price to pay. For example, United
States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia stated in a concurring opinion in a
death penalty case that "[o]ne cannot have a system of punishment without ac-
cepting the possibility that someone will be punished mistakenly. . . . But with
regard to the punishment of death in the current American system, that possibil-
ity has been reduced to an insignificant minimum."2 70 Who then is society will-
ing to tolerate as that "insignificant minimum," a gravedigger, an accused rapist,
the indigent? It is doubtful, however, that Malcolm Rent Johnson, who pro-
fessed his innocence until the day he was executed, would call himself an "in-
significant minimum."
American society's philosophical view of justice requires the highest
level of proof available when denying someone liberty and freedom, and this era
of technology has raised our cultural awareness to the scientific evidence avail-
able. Therefore, it comports with our view of justice to demand such evidence.
Our philosophical view of justice also relies on the tenet that only the guilty will
be punished. Because scientific evidence establishes an irrebuttable presumption
of guilt in jurors' minds, significant safeguards should be implemented to pro-
mote justice or to not create injustice by sending innocent men to jail based on
deficient or fraudulent scientific evidence. Rather than railing against this new
demand, those who practice the art of persuasion-lawyers-must adapt to new,
evolved scientific techniques of persuasion.
267 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 9 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
268 RAWLS, supra note 266, at 454.
269 JAMES P. STERBA, JUSTICE: ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 214 (3d ed. 1999).
270 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 199 (2006) (Scalia, J. concurring).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Below are several recommendations that, taken together or separately,
may serve to advance justice and help prosecutors and defendants deal with the
new, educated juror's demand for forensic evidence and the problems that this
demand creates.
A. Exonerations Only: The Extreme
The most extreme remedy for the problems with forensic evidence is to
exclude it completely at trial. This would mean forensic evidence could only be
used to exonerate, not incriminate, the defendant. Some commentators have
suggested this may be the best solution. "The most effective cure . . . may be
exclusion of the misleading expert testimony." 27 1 This is not practical, however,
nor does it serve our collective interests of justice.
A more workable solution may be to review the forensic science tech-
niques once again through the admissibility requirements of Daubert. This
would force the proponent of the evidence to justify the testing as well as force
the "gatekeeper," the trial judge, to determine the scientific validity of these
techniques. This review process may help bring to light some of the glaring in-
accuracies with forensic science techniques such as hair analysis.
B. Mandatory Crime Lab Accreditation
Most states already require DNA exoneration evidence to come from an
accredited laboratory when it is used in the exoneration of a previously convict-
ed defendant.2 72 This standard should be universally adopted among all types of
forensic evidence when used in any type of criminal proceeding. The American
Society of Crimes Laboratory Directors-Laboratory Accreditation Board audits
labs "to determine whether they are abiding by the quality assurance stand-
ards."273 The American Bar Association ("ABA") has also called for accredita-
tion of all crime laboratories.274 While some argue that this is impractical,275
standardizing practices across the industry in this manner would ensure that
examiners are continuing education. Accreditation, however, is not the sole an-
swer. It will not solve all the problems presented with forensic evidence. Alt-
hough accreditation "is not a panacea[, it is] a good first step." 2 76
271 Saks & Risinger, supra note 114, at 1063.
272 Berger, supra note 101.
273 Id. at 322.
274 id
275 See Beth A. Riffle, The Aftermath of Melendez: Highlighting the Need for Accreditation-
Based Rules ofAdmissibility for Forensic Evidence, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 165, 192 (2010).
276 DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 264, at 258.
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C Model Ethical Rules
In 2008, the ABA adopted two amendments to Model Rule 3.8, which
governs the role of prosecutors. 277 However, only one state, Wisconsin, has
adopted the amendments (g) and (h).278
Rules 3.8(g) and (h), Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, state:
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material
evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted de-
fendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was
convicted, the prosecutor shall: (1) promptly disclose that evi-
dence to an appropriate court or authority, and (2) if the convic-
tion was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, (i) promptly
disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes
delay, and (ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasona-
ble efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the
defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did
not commit.
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evi-
dence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor's jurisdic-
tion was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not
279
commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.
These amendments create an ethical obligation on the part of the prose-
cutor to disclose evidence that a defendant may have been wrongfully convict-
ed. This duty would include disclosure of forensic fraud. The rule, however,
would only have as much teeth as a given jurisdiction is willing to give it, and
aside from disciplinary measures against an offending prosecutor, the rule pro-
vides no recourse for a defendant harmed by the misconduct it prohibits.
D. Full Disclosure in Pretrial Discovery
Although it would seem evident, prosecutors and forensic examiners
have consistently argued against the pretrial discovery of scientific evidence.
Woodall's defense team received just such an opposition when it began arguing
for DNA testing in the case. 2 80 The arguments mainly concern fears that the
evidence may be destroyed, distorted, or misused in advance disclosure.281
277 Michele K. Mulhausen, A Second Chance at Justice: Why States Should Adopt ABA Model
Rules ofProfessional Conduct 3.8(g) and (h), 81 U. CoLO. L. REv. 309, 315-16 (2010).
278 Id. at 321.
279 Id. at 315-16.
280 See State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 259 (W. Va. 1989).
281 Giannelli, supra note 34, at 540.
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28However, critics have largely refuted these arguments.282 Additionally, these
arguments fail in light of concerns for the ability of a defendant to mount a
proper defense. "The need for full pretrial disclosure is especially important
with respect to scientific proof because this type of evidence is virtually impos-
sible to test or rebut at trial without an advance opportunity to examine it care-
fully." 283 Without pretrial discovery on the part of the prosecution, the defendant
will be denied due process and left without the raw materials integral to build an
effective defense.
Equally important to pretrial discovery is whether the defense intends to
argue the lack of scientific proof as evidence of the defendant's innocence. The
defense should also be required to notify the prosecution that it intends to use
this argument in order to afford the prosecution the time to provide scientific
proof. This could come in the form of a notice requirement, similar to affirma-
tive defenses such as self-defense.
E. Jury Instructions
Jury instructions are probably one of the most important aspects of any
case. Appropriately charging the jury can make or break a case for the defense
or the prosecution. Although several states, including Ohio, 2 84 have proposed
CSI effect jury instructions that would become part of the charge to the jury,
probably the most appropriate time to confront the issue of the CSI effect is dur-
ing voir dire. It is during jury selection that the defense can eliminate those ju-
rors who would be all too willing to blindly trust a prosecution expert and the
prosecution can eliminate those jurors who will heighten its burden of proof.
The judge can also use voir dire as a time to advise potential jurors of the differ-
ences between reality in the courtroom and courtroom television.
V. CONCLUSION
The American judicial system is ever-changing: it is not a stagnant enti-
ty. It is evident that the modern, educated, technologically-savvy juror has im-
pacted the system as a whole and that those in the legal community must adjust.
Judges must take it into consideration in instructing the jury, and lawyers must
take it into consideration in choosing the jury. An effective trial strategy could
employ it to either side's advantage. However, justice must be served through
ever-present elimination of fraud. More damaging than an acquittal due to lack
of scientific evidence is the conviction of an innocent defendant based on fake
scientific evidence. This heightened demand for forensic evidence coupled with
282 See id.
283 Id. at 539.
284 Nathan Koppel, Ohio Takes Action Against the 'CSI Effect' on Juries, WALL STREET J. L.
BLOG (May 28, 2010, 3:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/05/28/ohio-takes-action-against-
the-csi-effect-on-juries/.
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the heightened level of trustworthiness the jury gives to a testifying forensic
expert makes instances of fraud in the forensic community particularly damag-
ing to our collective idea of justice and resounds in the ears of many who de-
mand reform.
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